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ABSTRACT: At the dawn of the new millenium, the European continent faces 
some of its greatest challenges in decades, from the economic to the social and 
political. The task of addressing and meeting these challenges falls mostly on the 
shoulders of Europe's administrative elite - those who have the educational, 
technical and legal capabilities to solve the problematic issues facing Europe today. 
This study examines the role of administrative elites in European government and 
society, and the identification of several challenges that can be addressed by these 
same elites.
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ÖZET : Yeni binyılın başlangıcında, Avrupa kıtası ekonomiden, sosyal ve politik 
alana dek onyıllardan beri karşılaştığı en büyük zorluklarından bazılarıyla yüz yüze 
gelmiştir. Bu zorlukları tespit etmek ve çözmek, Avrupa'nın karşı karşıya olduğu bu 
sorunlu konuların üstesinden gelebilecek eğitim, teknik bilgi ve yasal yetkilere sahip 
olan Avrupa idari elit kadrolarına düşmekte. Bu çalışma, Avrupa hükümet ve 
toplumunda, idari elitin rolünü incelemekte ve aynı elit tarafından ele alınacak bazı 
zorlukların tanımını yapmaktadır.
Anahtar sözcükler: İdari elit, Avrupa, Azınlıklar, Milliyetçilik, Siyasi Birleşme
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Among the people of Europe, a deepening sense of crisis has been found at the 
beginning of the 21st Century as ethnic and religious tensions mount, as 
unemployment rises and economies stagnate, as mass movements of people 
increase, and as threats of terrorism and violence escalate. Since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Europe has experienced political, social 
and economic upheaval, focused mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, but 
nonetheless felt throughout Western Europe as well. The unification of Germany, the 
separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics, the continued Balkan instability, the 
on-again-off-again efforts at further integration of the European Union, and a 
stagnating European economy all acted as indicators in the 1990s of the enormous 
sea change that had engulfed Europe. The relative stability experienced by Europe 
after the Second World War, a result of Cold War politics and a rapidly expanding 
European economy, no longer existed as Europe looked to the new millennium.
While most Europeans are aware of the crises that threaten to disrupt their lives, they 
as individuals shoulder little responsibility, outside of electoral prerogatives, in 
finding solutions to the impending predicaments. Those to whom the daunting task 
of managing the woes of Europe falls upon are the administrative elites within the 
European states and European-wide governmental organizations. Although it is true 
that in the world today the influence of business and nongovernmental organizations 
has increased, governmental institutions within the context of the "nation-state" 
remain the primary form in managing state relations and the main force in policy 
initiation and utilization. Central to European governments are the administrative 
institutions established by individual states' constitutional requirements or by 
patterns of behavior acted out over time (e.g., British common law). European-wide 
institutions maintain a secondary, but steadily increasing, role in decision-making 
processes. Within this framework of European institutionalism work the 
administrative elites. Administrative elites are those, according to John A. 
Armstrong, who direct the administrative institutions, the individuals ultimately 
responsible for policy formation and implementation (Armstrong, 1973, p.3).
Defining Administrative Elites
As described by Armstrong, defining administrative elites, or even elites in general, 
can be a somewhat difficult task. How do you identify those individuals in positions 
of authority that could be considered "elite?" How do administrative elites differ 
from organizational and bureaucratic elites, if they differ at all? How can you 
separate bureaucracy from administration? Kenneth Farmer states that elites are 
those who possess "some characteristic highly valued by the community." (Farmer, 
1992:1). In general, the issue of elite definition depends primarily upon the 
institutional perspective of social and governmental structures.
A structural approach assumes that the political and social institutions of a society 
play a predominant role in determining the development of societal goals, while the 
free will of humans is comparatively irrelevant (Farmer, 1992:7). Structuralists thus 
focus on the office rather than the individual holding the office. For structuralists, an
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individual holding a particular position within the institutional hierarchy of a state 
becomes a member of the elite, regardless of his contributions to policy formation. 
While this may be somewhat deterministic, it is important to remember that human 
volition is not denied, rather it is subordinated to the institutional structures. A 
functionalist approach, on the other hand, sees the role played by the individual 
holding office as the defining factor in a society. State and social structures exist but 
it is the actors within these structures who guide the development of state doctrine1. 
Accordingly, individuals within institutional structures who contribute to the 
formation of state and social policy are identified as members of the elite.
The position of elite identification taken by this study is, broadly, a combination of 
both the structural and functional approaches, reflecting the implicit views taken in 
several analyses of administrative and bureaucratic elites. In these analyses can be 
found the combined characteristics of both structural and functional approaches, 
although the position cannot be classified as the archetypal structural-functionalist 
approach2. While granting that an office within the administrative structure can be 
institutionally influential independent of the individual holding that position, this 
study assumes that such an individual in a position of administrative authority would 
not have achieved this office without the proper personal qualifications.
Outside of broad theoretical statements, a more explicit understanding is required if 
the nature of the role of administrative elites in addressing challenges to Europe and 
the European states is to be understood. According to Armstrong, a popular 
distinction between elites is made as part of a disciplinary bias. Political scientists, 
in general, prefer the use of "administration" to refer to the "formally nonpolitical 
activities of government," while sociologists look at the same phenomena as 
"bureaucratic." (Armstrong,1973:6). For Farmer, one method of identifying 
administrative elites are those who possess "power," which is defined as the relative 
freedom from structural constraint (Farmer, 1992:7). Other definitions include those 
appointed to high public office or those born to fill administrative roles. Despite a 
seeming lack of consensus with in the field of political science, a definition of 
administrative elites can be culled from scholarly writings. In essence, what 
distinguishes administrative elites from other types of elites such as bureaucratic and 
political elites is determined by the combination of a number of characteristics, 
including education, socialization, family history, recruitment, elite-society 
relations, and role definition within the institutional framework of any given state 
and society.3
Beginning with education, in any number of European states, most of those who fill 
administrative elite positions within the governing institutions have had access to 
higher or special educational facilities, primarily in the form of universities, 
colleges, or special training schools (Aberbach, 1981:47). Rank and privilege in 
most states of Europe is partially determined even today by educational background, 
and this value is reflected by administrative elites and the institutions they lead. In 
the formerly socialist states of Europe, the educational system prior to the collapse 
of communism was more stringent, in effect indoctrinating and grooming the future
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administrative elites. As an example, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
most individuals preparing for administrative posts within Soviet government 
attended some higher institution prior to joining administrative offices. In such a 
system as the Soviet state established it was understood that to rise in the ranks of 
privileged administrators, one needed also to attend special party schools for 
Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, in addition to schools of higher education (Farmer, 
1992:54, 58-61).
After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, this party education and indoctrination of 
course ended. However, articles and exposés in the public media have indicated 
that eastern Europeans are now joining their western counterparts and applying a 
time-honored strategy in educating and employing their elites. For centuries, the 
primary method of obtaining first, an appropriate education, and second, an 
appropriate occupation was through family ties. Historically, sons and nephews of 
well-placed individuals found access to the halls of the proper educational 
institutions through their family connections. Later, these connections led to 
desirable jobs in positions of authority. A classic example is Alexis de Tocqueville, 
a son of a minor aristocrat, who was able to parlay his education and social status 
into a moderately famous tour of the United States and a position as a magistrate 
(Tocqueville, 1981:xx-xxiv). While Tocqueville's case is somewhat dated, it 
nonetheless demonstrates, historically, the role of family in obtaining high 
administrative positions. Even today it is acknowledged that influence-peddling, 
particularly of the familial variety, provides rare opportunities for advancement in 
education and in professional fields.
According to Armstrong, however, the variety of familial influence, education, and 
socialization within a European context is different than that found in the United 
States. European family connections are much closer on an intergenerational level, 
but remain more professional and businesslike than the American counterpart. The 
goal of placing a son or daughter in a high administrative post is to further the 
interests and historical prestige of the family, not a concern for the child's 
individual welfare. As noted by Armstrong, in Great Britain, "upper-class parents 
and children have been on visiting terms since Tudor days, with servants acting as 
foster parents," and boarding school becoming a surrogate home after early 
education (Armstrong, 1973: 97, 105-107). This similar phenomenon is found in a 
number of other European states as well. School and schooling consequently 
becomes an important factor in the training and socialization of administrative 
elites. Combined with familial ties and family history, the path to the heights of 
administrative institutions becomes more navigable.
Yet the process for achieving administrative elite status is not ended with the proper 
education, family history, and socialization. Also important is the recruitment 
process, elite-society relations, and role definition, the more theoretical aspects of 
establishing elite authority. After suitable schooling and childhood socialization, it 
is still possible for a number of young Europeans to fail in achieving administrative 
posts. This is due mostly to recruitment systems of various institutional structures.
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The primary method in the recruitment of European administrative elites is 
ascriptive in nature, in effect utilizing upper-class children, and particularly boys, 
as the main source of recruits (Armstrong, 1973:73). This holds true for most 
European states, with the notable exception of the former Soviet Union. Seventy 
years of communist rule lead to an administrative elite that, by the early 1970s, 
was characterized as primarily peasant, with a strong working class presence 
(Armstrong, 1973:74). Only a decade since the collapse of the Soviet regime, we 
can see the Russian Federation adapting itself to the realities of West European 
government, as technically and educationally sophisticated individuals take 
places within the hierarchy of Russian government (Savvateyeva, 1994:8-9). 
Certainly it is the case that in a number of former Soviet satellite states, members 
of social, cultural, or economic elites have obtained high positions in government 
org anizations.
In the modern world, the organization of state and society has become technical 
and functional in nature (see notation5). The organizational structure of a state 
and social unit "develops some division of labor, assigning responsibility for 
coordination to a small group." (Putnam, 1976:135). This leadership group (i.e., 
elite group) inadvertently begins to develop special skills and contacts, and 
begins to monopolize the control of information, thus acquiring power over other 
groups. To perpetuate its leading role, the elite group must transform this 
"coercive" power into willing obedience by the masses. It does so by developing 
and disseminating state and social doctrines that are accepted by the society 
(Armstrong, 1973:48, Putnam, 1976:136). While this is an endeavor that is made 
by all elites, administrative elites are particularly influential in the dispersion of 
what Armstrong labels "development doctrines," due to their ability to influence 
the technical aspects of government policy (Armstrong, 1973:47). With care, the 
distribution of the proper development doctrine ensures a relationship between 
the administrative elites and the masses that protects the role of the elite 
administrators within the state and social system. In addition, a favorable 
development doctrine (e.g. one that is not rejected by society) leads to a passive 
role definition, indicating that the elite administrator understands his role as non­
interventionist (Armstrong, 1973:19, 49). Whereas an active role definition might 
foster resentment in the public for perceived nondemocratic control, a perception 
of passive involvement leads to further acceptance by the masses and increased 
recruitment capabilities.
Introducing an acceptable development doctrine into a society creates the 
framework for establishing an administrative elite. Following up the dispersion 
of the doctrine with appropriate role definition and the necessary recruitment 
process further reinforces the leading role of administrative elites within a state 
structure. Through a process of socialization, education, and familial influence a 
"class" of citizen emerges with the ability and the authority to make 
administrative judgments and policy choices, and address challenges to the state. 
Yet, how are challenges to the state identified and defined? The following 
sections attempt to answer this question.
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In the early 1990s, at a meeting held to prepare a world summit, participants were 
asked to "brainstorm" and create a list of possible "shocks," or unexpected crises and 
events, that would be likely to occur within the following ten years. The participants' 
responses to the brainstorming session highlight one of the significant problems for 
administrative elites and others in positions of authority. Of the crises listed, only 
two of twenty had any overlap in support between participating states (Jacquemin 
and Wright, 1993:5). This demonstrates that although there exists numerous 
problems and crises needing resolution, there is often little agreement as to what are 
the important issues and what the priorities of European-wide institutions should be. 
Individual and group elites representing different administrative institutions will 
naturally have different priorities and agendas. Thus what is of important immediate 
concern for one elite cadre may be completely irrelevant to others.
In addition to having difficulty in identifying salient challenges, there exists the 
possibility that some of these crises cannot be easily solved, if at all, by 
administrative elites. To a certain extent, the role of administrative elites, while 
influencing cultural patterns, is normally understood within the context of 
governmental/political, economic, and to a lesser extent, social functions. Of the 
many problems that confront Europe as it passes the turn of the century, there are 
those that fall outside the direct purview of administrative elites. Such a potential 
problem as an extreme cultural and/or social trauma might induce, be it the growth 
of religious sentiment, the rise of alternative social movements or other phenomena, 
is not necessarily the direct responsibility of the administrative elites, nor should 
they necessarily be able to address such concerns. This is not to submit that the work 
of administrative elites has no value outside traditional governmental concerns, nor 
that their work does not influence and is influenced by society and culture. As both 
Armstrong and Farmer indicate, educational and social experience instill within 
administrative elites a role perception that "represents learned responses to social 
stimuli." (Armstrong, 1973:7). However, in the end, administrative elites are limited 
by the resources available to them, their own training and education, and the 
mandates of their positions. Administrative elites function within a governmental 
institutional structure where their responsibilities include guiding the formation and 
implementation of policy necessary for the state to function, not single-handedly 
solving the ills of a society.
For the benefit of limiting the focus of this study, a methodology has been selected 
that will distinguish European challenges that can be addressed by administrative 
elites from challenges and crises that are not directly related to administrative elites' 
roles or positions. In his work, The European Administrative Elite, Armstrong 
conducted an "exploratory study" of administrative elites in four European states. In 
addressing challenges that administrative elites faced and how they responded to 
crises, Armstrong created a framework for the identification of such challenges, one 
that would determine the saliency of these crises by the possession of four 
characteristics. First, each challenge must have been a problem of great magnitude
Identifying Challenges To Administrative Elites
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for all four states in the study. Second, the allocation and mobilization of resources 
should have been salient. Third, there must have been a strong potential for 
administrative intervention in solving the challenge. Finally, the "inherent physical 
properties of the challenge or its locus in time must [have been] sharply delimited." 
Armstrong, for the benefit of his specific study, added an additional practical 
element, that the challenge must have been sufficiently discussed (Armstrong, 
1973:275). Since Armstrong chose to focus his study on the special relationship 
between administrative elite mobilization and economic development, there were 
limited challenges that met his methodological requirements (Armstrong, 1973:4).
This study will take a broader scope to include social and political challenges as well 
as economic crises, while still attempting to limit the search for challenges that meet 
Armstrong's methodological standards. Increasing search parameters does not 
conflict with any of Armstrong's four criteria. More than twenty years after his 
classic work, world dynamics are significantly different than those of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The growth in communications and other technologies, the 
increased capability to travel, and the rise in multinational corporations conducting 
transnational business has brought political, social, and economic events in separate 
parts of the world into close proximity. War in the Balkans had a profound effect 
outside of the Balkan Peninsula. Repercussions from the unification of Germany and 
the collapse of the Soviet Empire are felt around the world still today, a decade after 
they happened.
In one sense, economics plays a central role in much of what occurs, as the German 
reunification example demonstrates. In addition to the political and social aspects of 
reunification, economically that act created the largest single market within Europe 
and virtually guaranteed Germany's leadership role in the European Union. What 
remains of Armstrong's framework is to determine the potential for administrative 
action and participation. Naturally, a broader base such as described will, of 
necessity, sacrifice some of the detailed analysis of Armstrong's study. However, the 
goal of this current research is to examine the challenges faced by administrative 
elites in the new millenium and beyond, not to reexamine a definitive work on the 
subject of administrative elites and their economic influences.
The salience and relevance of Armstrong's framework to this study becomes obvious 
when utilizing his methodology and applying it to the Europe of the new 
millennium. The number of crises and challenges that must be faced by 
administrative elites in each of the individual European states and within European- 
wide institutions become clearly delimited and well defined. A brief survey of the 
condition of Europe today reveals that significant challenges faces individual state 
administrative elites and that many of these crises are shared among a number of the 
European states. Reviewing scholarly literature, reading world news reports, 
watching international news programs, and examining governmental activities all 
provide good indicators as to what issues and problems concern the governments 
and peoples of Europe. Briefly, those that are found to be most universal in nature 
include the rise of nationalist fervor and the related growth of ethnic violence,
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minority rights, migration, and the increasing integration of political, economic, and 
social institutions. The next section examines each of these issues to determine how 
well they fit into Armstrong's methodological framework.
Defining Challenges to Administrative Elites 
Nationalism and Ethnic V i o l e n c e
Several of the most immediate crises facing a number of European states are closely 
related and include the problems of resurgent nationalism and corresponding ethnic 
violence. A prime indicator of the severe nature of these several problems is the 
series of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia that occupied much time in the 1990s. 
While the Yugoslav conflicts can be identified as crisis points for European states 
and Europe as a whole, do the issues they represented provide a genuine challenge 
to the European administrative elites based on Armstrong's methodological 
framework? Certainly nationalist tension is an important issue in any of the 
increasingly diverse European societies. In the Europe of the 1990s nationalism and 
minority rights became flashpoints of crises from Northern Ireland to Spain, 
Germany, and throughout central and Eastern Europe. One primary cause in the rise 
of nationalist and ethnic tension, and bringing the "problems of minorities in Europe 
into sharp prominence" was the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe 
(Hobswawn, 1990:163). With communism no longer a binding force on the peoples 
of Eastern Europe, newly elected "democratic" governments relied on appeals to the 
national majorities within their societies to help them consolidate state authority.
For most of the former Soviet satellite states of eastern and central Europe, the 
purpose of their governments has been to serve the needs of the new nations and 
their citizens, primarily identified as the dominant majority (Pajic, 1994:65). This 
focus aggravates the problem of minority rights by ignoring the minority 
constituents. In doing so, the new governments of eastern Europe subsume the 
rights of the minorities to those of the majority, a potentially dangerous situation 
that could lead to the growth of resentment by national minorities and foment 
nationalist, ethnic, and minority violence. The cases of Bosnia-Herezegovina and 
Kosovo were extreme example of this, with ethnic cleansing a fact of life, 
sponsored by a rump state that had collapsed around its nationalist constituency. Ye t 
in the East, Yugoslavia has not been the only example of rising nationalist tension. 
In western Romania and the Slovak Republic, ethnic Hungarians experience 
discrimination and other minority abuses on a daily basis, from the outlawing of 
their national tongue to the confiscation of property. Turkish minorities in most 
Balkan and central European states face housing, linguistic, and employment 
discrimination. East European and Balkan gypsies encounter much the same 
discrimination as the Turks, with children required to study in the majority language 
and constant attacks on their unique culture a grim reality. Albanians are not left out 
when confronted with hostility and violence in a number of former Yugoslav 
republics, Kosovo being only the most recent example (Gurr, 1993:181, 196, 205, 
328t).
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Western Europe also has not been able to escape the increasingly fractious 
nationalist elements that afflict the central and eastern sectors of the continent. The 
historically singular "nation-states" founded in the aftermath of the American and 
French Revolutions over time developed legal-institutional structures that reflected 
the cultural dominance of the majority nationality within each state. This has led to 
a so-called "crisis of national consciousness," with minority groups questioning the 
cultural, legal, and institutional dominance of the majority nationality (Hobsbawm, 
1990: 18-20, 22, 188). Older minority groups that have been living in relative calm 
within the existing institutional structures have been experiencing cultural 
reawakening and are reevaluating their roles in the current state and social 
structures. While to date protest is favored over open rebellion, the demands of such 
nationalist minority groups as the Bretons, Frisians, Galicians, Basques, and Irish 
are steadily mounting as discriminatory practices become too burdensome to 
continue accepting (Gurr, 1993: 139, 141).
The scope of the crisis of nationalism and minority rights certainly appears to fit 
Armstrong's criteria of the widespread nature of a challenge to administrative elites, 
with nationalist issues being raised from the farthest reaches of eastern Europe to the 
islands west of the continent. However, do the issues of nationalism, minority rights, 
and ethnic violence also hold true for Armstrong's other criteria? The above 
discussion reveals the nationalism question to fit at least one of Armstrong's other 
standards, that of the challenge having the physical properties or locus in time that 
is sharply delimited. In the East, its is not difficult to demonstrate that the collapse 
of communism acted as the catalyst for nationalist fervor, dating the rise of renewed 
nationalism to a specific period of time, 1989-1991. The return to nationalist 
ideology as a method of consolidating state power by very nearly all of the former 
communist states thus has placed the nationalist issue at a specific locus in time, 
while at the same time the physical properties of the challenge (ethnic violence, 
nationalist discrimination) become obvious and delimited.
The nationalist question in the West became a significant concern at roughly the 
same moment in time. It can be argued that although there exists a long history 
of struggle among some ethnic and nationalist groups such as the Basques of 
Spain and the Irish of Northern Ireland, the locus in time for the rise of 
nationalist tension is also limited to the later half of the 1980s and the early part 
of the 1990s. While it has been asserted by some scholars that the time to study 
a problem is when "the problems that are actual in the world today first take 
visible shape," the events of the last ten years have created a contemporary locus 
in time for the rise of nationalism in Western Europe (Barraclough, 1967: 20). 
Prior to the 1980s nationalist movements were primarily attempts at retaining 
cultural identification within a state that contained an overwhelming majority 
nationality. With the collapse of communism, the reunification of Germany, 
erratic economic prospects, and growing fears of migration, many nationalist 
groups passively residing in Western Europe have now, at the beginning of the 
new millennium, moved to reclaim what they believe is theirs by history and by 
legal right (Hobsbawm, 1994: 10). Reports of Welsh towns being renamed in the
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Welsh language, the South Tyrolians and Bretons reaffirming cultural and territorial 
history, and the increased use of Catalan as a means of communication all indicate 
that previously acquiescent minority groups are becoming more visible in the 
defense of their traditional culture.
The potential for administrative elite involvement in these issue areas, another of 
Armstrong's four characteristics, is quite high in bringing resolutions to the 
challenges of nationalism and ethnic violence. The manifestation of most ethnic and 
nationalist demands appears primarily in the form of calls for independence or 
increased autonomy from the institutional structures of a state. While these types of 
demands are political in nature, they are not explicitly so, due to the policy oriented 
character of such demands and the role played by both political and administrative 
elites in the policy process (Aberbrach, 1981:85). Politicians, according to 
Aberbach, serve a broadbased constituency with ill-defined focus on matters of 
policy. They can make general assessments, agreements, or even concessions, but 
their actions lack the necessarily solid legal and institutional foundation. 
Administrators, on the other hand, serve a much narrow constituent base, their role 
being sharply defined. They are the technical experts who develop the policy 
foundations of political actions (Aberbrach, 1981: 90).
A decision to grant nationalist demands such as political autonomy does naturally 
have to be made by the political elite of a state, as often they are the nominally 
constitutional leaders. Yet it remains up to the administrative elites’ to see that the 
new policy directives are implemented and fulfilled. Administrative elites’ technical 
focus affects policy decisions in that the viability of political resolutions remains 
dependent on the ability of administrative elites to execute policy prescriptions. If the 
implementation of a policy proposal is untenable, the political decision is influenced. 
To simply grant a national minority autonomous or independent status may be a 
reasonable solution to a potentially explosive situation, yet to grant autonomy or 
independence requires far more than simply agreeing to the alteration of the current 
institutional arrangements. One of the more recent referendums on Quebec's 
independence from Canada, while not exactly European in nature, demonstrates the 
political nature of a nationalist question. Fearing the demise of their cultural and 
national heritage, French-speaking Canadians in the province of Quebec held the 
referendum in order to separate themselves from Canada. While this would be an 
enormous political situation, it is not one of immediate impact. According to a New 
York Times article, if the vote had favored independence, it would have been years 
before there was any real move to absolute independence (Farnesworth, 1995:3). The 
process of establishing independence requires significant policy changes which must 
be guided by administrative elites and certainly cannot be completed in a short 
amount of time. In the same manner, other nationalist demands with policy 
implications, be it conducting business and education in a national language, 
observing nationalist holidays, or extending the limits of sovereignty, necessarily 
requires the involvement of the administrative elite.
Of Armstrong's four criteria, his idea that allocation and mobilization of resources 
be salient is deceivingly simple. It can be argued that nationalist issues raised in each
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state of Europe require the utilization of resources in solving the problem, but this 
does not necessarily make the use of resources salient to the challenge. To a certain 
extent, the use of financial, social, or political resources is a part of the daily life and 
routine of any governmental administrator. What is important for a challenge in 
meeting Armstrong's requirement is that the allocation and mobilization of resources 
be case specific. In the instance of resurgent nationalism and escalating ethnic 
violence, it can be argued that resources used to combat this challenge are salient to 
the crisis.
A number of states in Europe, particularly in the West, have set aside financial 
resources to address nationalist concerns. A case in point, educating children of 
national minorities in their native language is certainly not cost effective for a state 
with a large dominant majority. Yet this is exactly what is occurring across Europe 
as administrators attempt to stem the tide of rising nationalism. Another example is 
the increasing funding and use of inter-European organizations whose purpose it is 
to settle matters of conflict within and among the states of Europe. The Council of 
Europe has recently come into prominence as a tool for addressing nationalist 
concerns, as has the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
(Schumann, 1990:99). These and other organizations have utilized resources in 
recent years for the specific purpose of solving nationalist issues, be it the numerous 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or the education of ethnic Turks in Germany. 
Ultimately, while funding for the resolution of nationalist concerns is a constant, the 
increased saliency of nationalist issues will entail a corresponding increase in the 
allocation and mobilization of resources to address such considerations.
Minority Rights
As noted above, the issue of minority rights has been brought to prominence by the 
events of 1989-1991, particularly in Eastern Europe. Much of what has been said 
about nationalism holds true for the challenge of minority issues. From the desire to 
learn in a minority language to calls for autonomy in regions predominantly 
inhabited by minority nationalities, it is often hard to separate minority issues from 
nationalist issues. Efforts to rejuvenate historical or cultural ties are often ethnic in 
nature, focusing on shared language, common history, or kinship ties, and later 
developed into nationalists issues, such as the quest for self-government. The 
purpose of this section is to note the possible existence of cases where nationalism 
and minorities are separated from one another and to examine if such a case could 
fit into Armstrong's crisis framework.
As has been stated, separating minority issues from nationalist questions is not an 
easy task. Yet it is not entirely impossible, for the simple reason that minority 
questions are not restricted to nationalist characteristics, nor are all nationalist issues 
related to minority rights. One manifestation of nationalism that has not been 
examined in this study is that of majoritarian nationalism. In many states of Europe 
there is a corresponding rise of majoritarian nationalism, in response to increased 
minority nationalist activity. Unfortunately, the cases of majority nationalist
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expression are often tainted by increased and active discrimination rather than 
reaffirmation of "self-national" pride. The type of activities referred to are manifest 
primarily as anti-Semitic or anti-minority demonstrations, which have historical 
precedents dating to the late 19th century (Hobsbawm, 1990:105, 166-174). German 
extremists firebombing Turkish workers' hotels and ethnic dance clubs, former 
Soviet republics disenfranchising ethnic Russians, and the multiple ethnic conflicts 
in the Balkans are all grim reminders that majorities have not always treated fairly 
nationalist minorities.
It is well documented that minorities have often suffered at the hands of majoritarian 
regimes, some for several hundreds of years. Political marginalization and economic 
discrimination, nominally caused by systematic exclusion from access points in the 
political or economic arenas of a society, have prevented minority groups from 
fulfilling social and cultural goals (Gurr, 1993:42-43, 46-48). However, these 
practices are not based solely on responses to ethnicity and nationality. Two groups 
that are well ensconced within minority issues have little to do with questions of 
nationality. They are, respectively, racial minorities and religious minorities. Of 
these two groups the former does not appear to have become involved in issues of 
crises proportion, such as those examined in this study. While Europe remains 
predominately white, it is increasingly becoming "darker" as migration increases 
from Turkey, the Middle East, and former colonial holdings in the Third World. 
Using Armstrong's theoretical framework, the question of race does not appear to be 
a challenge needing the attention of administrative elites. Race questions are not a 
problem of great magnitude for any of the states of Europe (see notation 4), nor has 
there been salient allocation and mobilization of resources. While there is strong 
potential for administrative elite intervention, current research does not indicate that 
there has been an extensive elite mobilization to address issues of race, which has 
often been associated with national, ethnic, or immigration issues. Finally, the 
"inherent physical properties" of race or its locus in time have not manifested 
themselves. A primary cause for the failure of such a manifestation is that many of 
those who come to Europe are not so much defined racially as they are ethnically or 
nationally. Thus questions of race are subsumed to issues of nationalism.5
Religious minorities, however, are more problematic when their case is applied to 
Armstrong's crisis framework. Europe has historically been Christian (Catholic and 
Protestant) with only marginal inroads made by non-Christian peoples during the 
height of the Ottoman Empire and the North African occupation of the Iberian 
peninsula. Many of those who currently migrate to Europe in search of a better life 
are less often Christian and predominately Muslim, joining an increasingly active 
Islamic minority in a number of European states. Accompanying the increase in 
Islamic migration and activism is an increase in Muslim fundamentalism and 
terrorism (Gurr, 1993: 21, 116). The enlarged Islamic presence in Europe does 
certainly seem to be a challenge of great magnitude. A core component of the early 
1990s crisis in Bosnia was religious, with Christian Serbs intent upon eradicating the 
Bosnian Muslim presence in the Balkans. For its involvement in North Africa, 
France has suffered numerous terrorist attacks, most claimed or attributed to
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fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organizations. Even the Dutch, who are historically 
famous for their religious tolerance, have had difficulty with the Islamic question, as 
mosques and Muslim community centers are subject to defacement and vandalism. 
In some cases, the issue is primarily one of nationalism, as with Turkish workers in 
Germany. However, Arabs, North and Central Africans, Central Asians, and 
Pakistanis are also migrating to Europe and they too share the common thread of 
Islam.
The locus in time or physical properties of the Islamic question are delimited by the 
increased violence of and against Muslims in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, 
meeting a second of Armstrong's requirements. Prior to the 1980s, violent actions 
taken against Muslim minorities were predominantly nationalist in nature, focusing 
on the country of origin rather than the religion. For the last ten years, however, the 
growing Islamic presence in Europe, and the increasing Islamic militantism in 
former colonial holdings have made many Europeans fearful of a Muslim influence 
in their states and societies. Some attribute the cause of conflict to be the philosophy 
that Muslims bring with them (which is found to be inherently incompatible with 
Western values), rather than the increasing numbers of Muslims who come to 
Europe (Gurr, 1993:250). Others claim that it is not the religion per se, but the 
cultural values of the countries of origin or the tendency of Islam to vest state 
authority on religion and nationality, again tying the issue to nationalism (Robinson, 
1994: 215-216).
For whatever reason, the growing presence of Islam in European societies has 
become a challenge at the beginning of the new millennium. Is this a challenge that 
can be addressed by administrative elite, again another of Armstrong' s 
requirements? By most appearances, the issue of a growing Islamic presence in 
Europe can be addressed by elite administrators. One important aspect of 
administrative elite authority is developing and distributing state and social doctrine 
(as discussed in the first section). Administrative elites have it within their ability to 
create, over time, a social "philosophy" through policy prescription that allows for 
the acceptance of Islam within European society. By altering the development 
doctrine of a society, elite administrators can bring about public acceptance of Islam 
and Muslims to a society, providing of course that social values allow for this type 
of adjustment. While this is not a short-term endeavor, the steps can be taken now 
to lay the foundations for future doctrinal adjustment.
A further possibility of elite involvement in solving the Islamic question also relates 
to the salient allocation and mobilization of resources, the last of Armstrong's 
requirements. Important to any migrant group is integration into a society. For 
Muslim immigrants to Europe, this has been a less than successful undertaking. For 
administrative elites, it is necessary to create policies that will assist Muslims in 
integrating into their new societies (Miller, 1995). These policies do, of course, take 
time and money to initiate, develop, and implement. In addition to adjusting native 
perspectives on the influx of Muslims, it is also necessary to educate the Muslim 
immigrants as to the culture and traditions of their new home, to educate them in
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order to become productive members of their society, and to help them adapt to their 
new lives. Education might have to initially be bilingual, until recent immigrants can 
grasp the new language. Special dispensation may be needed for housing, religious 
questions, or any number of other social factors. Finally, many new Muslim 
immigrants face open and public hostility, at times requiring special police 
protection. Almost any extraordinary action taken by elite administrators to facilitate 
the integration of Islamic migrants into a culture will have inherent costs, and due 
to the growing presence of Islam in Europe, many of these costs are found to be 
salient allocations of available resources in determining the nature, and addressing 
the issues, of the Islamic challenge.
Migration
Migration is another issue, such as nationalism or minority rights, that has a long 
history where Europe is concerned. Traditionally a source of emigration, Europe 
has, in the last twenty-five years become a major source of immigration as migration 
patterns have changed globally (Castles and Miller, 1998:65, 78, 81, Purcell, 
1993:216). Governments across Europe have a vested interest in migration issues 
and many are taking moves to address migration problems. Even some non- 
traditional governments are becoming involved in the debate, as even Papal 
speeches have demonstrated (Bohlen, 1995:7). Yet, is there enough of a concern 
about the nature of migration in the Europe of the 2000 to constitute a challenge to 
the administrative elite? In terms of magnitude, migration is an issue that has 
international implications for much of Europe. Many states of Western Europe have 
become receiving countries for much of the worlds immigrant population. 
Immigrants from former colonial holdings, lesser developed countries, and the 
former communist bloc all look to Western Europe for their futures. In addition to 
the favored Northern and Western European states, countries such as Italy, Greece, 
and Spain have also attracted a large immigration movement, particularly from Asia 
and Africa (Castles and Miller, 1998: 80t, 81). Even former Soviet satellite states, 
such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, have become destinations for those 
seeking new lives for themselves and their families. In a study conducted in the early 
1990s to determine shaping factors for Europe in that decade and beyond, seven of 
twelve thinktanks participating in the study stated that migration issues were 
significant economic, social, and political concerns for the future (Jaquemin and 
Wright, 1993:236, 289, 295, 322-323, 363, 390). Tellingly the French group noted 
that France was reticent in acknowledging any immigration concerns, focusing 
instead on the "uniqueness" of the French cultural tradition and the search for French 
identity, an interesting avoidance of an obvious concern (Jaquemin and Wright, 
1993:206-208). For the span of time given, it is remarkable that even today, the same 
concerns exist.
Whether acknowledged or not, the issue of migration does appear to be of 
significant magnitude to qualify it for an authentic European challenge. However, 
this does not necessarily make it a salient issue with regards to the nature of the 
challenge. Armstrong's requirement was that the challenge must have "inherent
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physical properties" or a "locus in time" that is sharply delimited. Do the 
immigration concerns of Europe today have delimited properties or are they rather 
part of the ongoing development of migration, continuously shaped by changing 
historical factors? It can be argued that the migration problems of today are well 
defined and salient for this period of time. While migration is continuous and 
historical in nature, a number of developments have established migration as a 
salient challenge. One of the most significant factors has been the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc (Kussbach, 1992:646). As with nationalist and ethnic issues, the demise 
of the Soviet Union opened the floodgates of the migration issue. While some 
expected the flow of people from Eastern Europe to come to an end, the opposite 
proved true. The reasons for leaving the former Soviet and Soviet satellite states are 
manifold, primary among them economic instability, social unrest, armed conflict, 
resurgent nationalism, and political unease (Kussbach, 1992: 647-650). All of these 
problems are not new to the issue of migration. However, the suddenness of their 
development can be tied directly to the collapse of the Eastern bloc, creating, at least 
from the East European perspective, a specific locus in time and inherent physical 
properties that are salient for European administrative elites.
Outside of East-West issues the migration question is not so clearly delimited. 
Economic productivity, aging populations, and low birthrates in industrialised 
Western Europe, some of the traditional sources of the need for immigrant 
populations (as a disposable workforce), have become less viable factors with 
regards to the migration issue. While older populations and lower birthrates still 
afflict European states, they have, to a certain extent, been countered by industrial 
modernization, slow economic growth, and previous migrations. The times when 
hundreds of thousands of "gastarbeiter" were needed and allowed into Germany 
have been replaced by a period of economic uncertainty and rising hostility towards 
foreign workers. Still, evaluation of global migratory movements since 1973 clearly 
demonstrate that Europe remains a preeminent destination for those seeking a new 
life in a foreign country (Castles and Miller, 1998:6m).
In the past fifteen years or so, the type of immigration has also changed. Historically, 
migration of single adults into Europe for economic and labor reasons was the norm. 
Since the 1980s the focus has shifted to "finding the right balance between worker 
and family migrations," as well as the prevention of illegal migration. In most 
Western European states today, the basis for legal immigration falls under family 
reunification criteria (Castles and Miller, 1998:88-89). This has a significant effect 
on immigration patterns to Europe in that not only are non-working relatives 
allowed in, but relatives capable of holding work as well.
In terms of the ability of administrative elites to address the migration challenge, the 
question is nearly moot. Administrative elites, as the guardians of state policy, are 
almost solely responsible for the technical application of policy. While there are the 
necessary and obvious political concerns over migration issues, the burden of 
solving the migration challenges lies almost exclusively with elite administrators. 
They are responsible for formulating and implementing migration policies,
49
determining the parameters for legal entry into a state, and developing strategies for 
the prevention of illegal immigration. James Purcell sees the current migration 
dilemma in Europe, and around the world, as reflecting "the absence of...policy 
measures or mechanisms to address migration pressures," which falls under the 
mandate of elite administrators in a state and European-wide context (Purcell, 
1993:217-218). While individual states may develop migration controls, in the 
Europe of the 21st Century, a more integrated European system, with open internal 
borders and the free flow of goods, services, and workers, necessitates the creation 
of a pan-European migration program and strategy, further attesting to both the 
scope of the migration challenge and the necessary involvement of administrative 
elites (Castles and Miller, 1998:269-270). The real challenge to administrative elites 
in solving the migration dilemma is to develop policy approaches that are equitable 
to all parties involved, including sending and receiving states, but most importantly 
to the immigrants and their families.
Identifying the allocation and mobilization of resources as a salient component of 
the migration dilemma proves to be somewhat difficult for the simple fact that most 
of the allocation of resources towards migratory control is a continuous activity. 
Monitoring borders for illegal entry, verifying citizenship or status for work-related 
concerns, or updating and reviewing citizenship and immigration policies are 
historic enterprises on the part of state bureaucratic and administrative structures. 
Proving unequivocally that the allocation of resources in the 1990s was any different 
than that of previous decades would take a great deal of fiscal investigation to verify. 
However, a simpler approach may suffice. In many instances, the allocation and 
mobilization of resources occurs as administrative elites implement policies 
designed to solve problems of great magnitude. Therefore, it would not be 
unreasonable to conjecture that the increasing awareness of the migration dilemma 
by administrative elites, and their attempts to solve this problem, is accompanied by 
an increased mobilization of resources for the implementation of migratory control 
policies. Repatriation, intensified verification, updating legalization procedures, and 
increased border monitoring all include the increased use of fiscal, social, and 
political resources.
Political, Social, and Economic Integration
In terms of Armstrong's methodology, the issue of whether or not the political, 
social, and economic integration of Europe represents a challenge to the 
administrative elite could not be simpler. Begun in the 1950s, stagnating in the 
1970s, and reemerging in the 1980s, only to stall once again at the millennium, there 
is great concern over the nature of this challenge. With consideration to its scope 
alone, integration is obviously European-wide. By basic definition the nature of 
European integration as a challenge must represent a concern of great magnitude. It 
involves, at its core, the European Union (EU), EU associate states, and the 
European Free Trade Association states (EFTA), all of which include nearly every 
country in western and central Europe, as well as Scandinavia. In the thinktank 
project mentioned above, every single group involved listed the integration process
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as the single most pressing concern of the 1990s and beyond (Ross, 1995:1). The 
possibility that a state would not have a vested interest in the terms of integration is 
marginal. Even states which do not belong to any of the above organizations, such 
as the Russian Federation, still have concerns that need to be addressed with respect 
to the challenge of integration.
The potential for administrative involvement in solving the challenge and the salient 
allocation and mobilization of resources also require little evidence. As with the 
scope of the integration challenge, the ability of administrative elites to become 
involved in the solution to the problem is expected considering the nature of the 
dilemma. Throughout the history of European integration, administrative elites, 
represented by such individuals as Jean Monnet and Jacque Delors, have been the 
responsible architects of policies designed to facilitate the process. Although there 
is a great deal of political involvement in the process of integration, the details of 
integration fall to the technical experts who, as discussed in the first section, are 
responsible for the implementation of policy. Between 1992 and 1999, the 
integration process stalled, leaving Europe in the midst of an unfinished conversion 
(Ross, 1992:2-4). The introduction of the Euro in 1999 was thought to help 
jumpstart the process again, but its poor performance in the two years since its 
introduction, has done little to alleviate the concerns of a number of EU member 
states. In such a time, the role of the administrative elites is of great importance in 
adjusting policies between and among the various states so that the integration 
process can move forward.
Integrating all three spheres into a single unit also requires some resource 
expenditure. The cost of altering political, social and economic structures both in 
fiscal and political terms, is a long and involved process. Add to that the desire of 
many of the newly liberated East European states who wish to join in on the 
integration venture, and the cost of accommodating their needs or proffering 
alternatives calls for an even greater mobilization and utilization of resources. Open 
borders, free movement of goods and labor, common currency, each requires 
resources for implementation and each places a burden on the administrative elites 
to allocate the resources effectively.
Demonstrating that political, social, and economic integration exists as a challenge 
with a specific locus in time or delimited physical properties is equally simple. 
While European integration began in the 1950s with the creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), the 
European Economic Community (EEC), and continued with their merger in 1967 
into the European Community (EC), the realities of European integration have not 
been that successful. The EC was considered a model of integration, but the fact was 
that disagreement and reluctance in moving toward integration led to a period of 
stagnation and near collapse for the EC in the 1970s (Ross, 1995:2-4, Ross, 
1992:487). In the mid-1980s a process of expansion began, with the approval of the 
Single European Act (SEA) by the EC. The SEA provided for the continued 
integration of the EC and the eventually opening of borders by the end of 1992,
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moving the EC from a purely economic union into one with political and social 
considerations as well (Ross, 1995:2). The process of growth was renewed and until 
1992 was well on the way to becoming "the international beacon for humane 
capitalism," and a developing political influence equal to its economic capabilities. 
(Ross, 1992:488) Since 1992, however, with the repudiation of the "Maastricht 
Treaty," and the instability of the Euro, some states within Europe, most notably 
Great Britain, have balked at the idea of continuing this rapid pace of integration, 
creating a crisis point for the integration process. The recent EU Summit in Nice and 
its support for expansion notwithstanding, the path toward continued integration is 
still littered with obstacles that are a direct result of operative policy choices over 
the last ten years. Thus, the locus of time and the physical properties of the 
integration dilemma are focused on the past ten years, when, at the urging of the 
European Commission, efforts were made to accelerate the process.
Conclusion
Based on the methodology of this study, nationalism, ethnic questions, minority 
rights, migration, and the continued integration of the European Union all appear to 
qualify as challenges for the European administrative elites. Yet to say that these few 
issues are the sole problems faced by elite administrators would be naive. The work 
of administrative elites is to guide states and societies through both placid and 
turbulent times, creating policies to address the needs of the masses and promoting 
stable social, political, and economic environments. While the above issues are 
currently of significant importance, they will not always remain so. There are 
constant challenges waiting in the wings, some are on the verge of international 
significance, while others may be as yet regional in nature. Issues of race, aging 
native European populations, and questions of cultural identity by traditional 
majoritarian groups are all potential challenges at a European-wide level. Some 
issues, such as migration or questions relating to European Union may not be 
addressed for years to come, while nationalist and minority issues may soon be 
resolved as a matter of administrative policy, or shrink to regional concerns as states 
work independently to solve their problems. The important concern here is to note 
that while it may not be difficult to discern challenges facing these elites, the nature 
of the challenges will constantly be changing, with old challenges possibly 
resurfacing after time. Thus the role of administrative elites, regardless of the nature 
of state and social development doctrines, is of great importance for the prosperity 
of Europe in the 21st Century.
Notes
1. A number of scholars have studied the nature of elites, and ideas regarding their 
roles, positions, etc. are many. Max Weber's contribution to elite theory is the notion 
of Verstehen, or understanding. It was his belief that social events were caused by 
voluntary human actions, and not by the influences of social structure. Theda 
Skocpol, more of the structuralist school, believes that only after the study of the 
"institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society" can one
52
make sense of the nature of elites. Vilfredo Pareto's famous contribution to the 
analysis of elites was the notion of the "circulation of elites," were groups of elites 
would replace one another within the institutional structures of society. See Farmer, 
chptr. 1 for a thorough overview of theoretical approaches. Other sources for 
theoretical approaches, in particular definitions of functionalism and structuralism, 
include Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Comparative Politics: Notes and 
Readings (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964); Gabriel A. Almond and G. 
Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics Today: A World View, (Harp-Collins 
Publishers, 1992); and Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of 
the Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).
2. The classic-structural functionalist approach is concerned with asking the 
appropriate questions in social science research, most notably; What structures are 
involved? What functions have been performed? What functions take place within a 
given structure? This study does not look to exam the structures, nor does it try to 
identify the depth of function being performed. The assumption is made that the 
structures exist and within those structures are the delegated tasks of administrative 
elites. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7 (New York: 
MacMillan and the Free Press, 1968), p. 22.
3. There is little that is essentially different between the composition of 
administrative and bureaucratic elites. There is also little agreement as to exactly 
what each entails. Armstrong's pithy statement is supported by Aberbach and 
company, while Farmer observes institutional differences, essentially revolving 
around the notion of power. For this study, administrative elites are understood to 
differ from bureaucratic elites primarily in the methods of recruitment, family 
origins, position within the institutional structures of a state, and the relative 
autonomy of elite positions. Armstrong, p. 6, Farmer, p. 7, Joel D. Aberbach, Robert 
D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats & Politicians in Wes tern 
Democracies (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1981) pp. 84-85.
4. In no state of the 1992 programme survey did any of the participants list race as 
an imminent threat to the stability of their state or to that of Europe. Jacquemin and 
Wright, chapters 6-17.
5. Race is a separate issue area infrequently studied within a European context. 
Most racial associations are made with respect to nationalist, ethnic, or immigration 
issues. See Fascist Europe: The Rise of Racism and Xenophobia (London: Frank 
Cass & Company Ltd., 1994), edited by Glyn Ford.
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